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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND STATES'
RIGHT TO REGULATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
*NoAM ZAMIR & PAUL BARKER

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),' which was signed in

November 2015 by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, is said to establish
new terms for trade and investment deals. 2 The TPP was intended to establish a
free trade area in the Asia-Pacific covering nearly 40 percent of global GDP and a
third of global trade.3 The agreement also forms an integral part of broader
4
geopolitical calculations in the region. However, the TPP as currently drafted can
only come into force if ratified by six or more of the States Parties representing at
least 85% of the GDP of the twelve original signatories. This prospect is now

* Dr. Noam Zamir, LLB (Colman), BCL (Oxon), PhD (Cantab), Assistant Professor, City University of
Hong Kong, School of Law.
Paul Barker, MA (Cantab), LLM (Columbia), Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London.
1. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d3_en.pdf.
2. See Kevin Granville, The Trans-PacificPartnership, Explained, THE NEW YORK TtMEs (Aug.
20,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacificpartnership.html ('The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the largest regional trade accord in history, would set
new terms for trade and business investment among the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim
nations'); Mehreen Khan, Why TPP is the most important acronym you've never heard of, THE

TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/ll913939/What-is-TransPacific-Partnership-TPP-Obama-Japan.html; see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The
Trans-PacificPartnership,https://ustr.gov/tpp/.

3. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership,
https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP ("Through this agreement, the Obama Administration seeks to
boost U.S. economic growth and support the creation and retention of high-quality American jobs by
increasing exports in a region that includes some of the world's most robust economies and that

represents nearly 40 percent of global GDP."); see also Granville, supra note 2 (stating "the United
States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations - a far-flung group with an annual gross domestic product of
nearly $28 trillion that represents roughly 40 percent of global G.D.P. and one-third of world trade.").
4. President Obama, The TPP Would Let America, not China, leadthe way on global trade, THE
WASHINGTON POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-

tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-OfdO-1 I e6-93ae50921721165d story.html ("The world has changed. The rules are changing with it. The United States,
not countries like China, should write them. Let's seize this opportunity, pass the Trans-Pacific

Partnership and make sure America isn't holding the bag, but holding the pen.").
5. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
art.
30.5,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d3_en.pdf.
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unlikely following the new U.S. administration's announcement in January 2017
that it will not ratify the treaty,6 amidst a rising tide of anti-free trade sentiment
around the world.7 Nevertheless, other States Parties to the TPP continue to strive
8
for ratification in one form or another, and the TPP will arguably remain a
benchmark for future trade deal negotiations.
The political response to, and widespread scepticism towards the TPP and
other international investment agreements (HAs) is complex and widely debated.
This article will focus on one issue that has played an important role in framing the
debate on the TPP: the potential impact of the TPP (and similar deals) on States'
right to regulate public welfare under international investment law.
In response to a growing number of investment treaty arbitrations arising out
9
of regulatory measures taken by host States, the recent trend in IIA practice has
been to include express language in the treaty preamble reaffirming the right to
regulate, to provide greater guidance on the standards of investment protection as
they apply to regulatory measures, and to carve out general exceptions, for
example, measures taken for the protection of the environment, public health or
0
financial stability.'
As the tribunal in Lemire v. Ukraine" stated, the host States enjoys an
"inherent right to regulate (.. .) in order to protect the common good of its
people." 1 2 Indeed, it is said that HAs "may not be read as preventing States from
3
bona fide regulation in the public interest"' and that it is necessary "to balance
objectives of the host State, and in
policy
investment protection with competing
interest."' 4 In a recent high profile
public
particular, with its right to regulate in the
award rejecting Philip Morris' claims against Uruguay relating to tobacco control
measures, an eminent tribunal held that there is a "consistent trend" in awards and
treaty practice differentiating an indirect expropriation from a non-compensable
6. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-PacificPartnership, Obama's Signature Trade Deal,

NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.htmlr=0.

7. Martin Wolf, The Tide of Gloablisation is Turning, FINANCIAL TimES (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/87bb0eda-7364-1 1e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
8. Jason Scott, Australia Strives for 'TPP Minus 1' After Trump Withdraws, REUTERS (Feb. 7,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/australia-striving-for-tpp-minus-1 -after-trump-swithdrawal.

9. Recent Trends in HAs and ISDS - IIA Issues Note No.1, UNCTAD (Feb. 2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepeb20l5dlen.pdf.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSIID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability (Jan. 14, 2010).
12. Id.1505.
13.

Expropriation-A

(2012),
II, UNCTAD
Expropriation - A Sequel].
14.

Sequel - UNCTAD Series on Issues in InternationalInvestment Agreements

85,

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf

[hereinafter

Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment

Agreements II, UNCTAD (2012), xiii, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia20l1Id5_en.pdf.
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regulatory measure.' 5 However, the circumstances in which a host State may still
be obliged to compensate a foreign investor for a regulatory measure having an
econonc impact on a protected investment remain contested. In Daimler v.
Argentinal, for example, the Tribunal agreed that host States have the right to
regulate the economy as they see fit, but held that:
[W]here Argentina elects to exercise its powers in a manner that
contravenes one of Argentina's voluntarily assumed international
obligations to German investors under the German-Argentine BIT, and
where such contravention specifically harms the Claimant's investment,
Argentina must compensate the Claimant for the violation.' 7
Against this background, critics of investment treaty arbitration assert that
tribunals illegitimately interfere with States' core public policy prerogatives and
that an award of damages against host States can have a "chilling effect on future
governmental conduct by preventing governments from adopting certain courses of
action for fear of future liability."' 8 These concerns have translated into heightened
public scrutiny of investment treaty arbitration awards and of IIA negotiations,
including the TPP.19
Accordingly, this paper seeks to establish the extent to which the States
Parties to the TPP have negotiated the treaty's language to address concerns
regarding their right to regulate, and how consistent this has been with the efforts
of non-TPP parties, such as the European Union, in their treaty negotiations. As the
current uncertainty surrounding the TPP's ratification partly demonstrates, it
remains an open question whether the contents of the TPP's investment protection
chapter will be sufficient to secure the confidence of all stakeholders.
It has been suggested elsewhere that the TPP's Investment Chapter sets a new
worldwide standard.2 o We suggest that the Investment Chapter is nevertheless

15. Philip Morris Brands SArl, Philip Morris Products SA, Abal Hermanos SA v. Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award 1295 (July 8, 2016).
16. Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22,
2012).
17. Id. ¶ 100.
18. Anthea Roberts, The Present - Investment Arbitration as a Governance Tool for Economic
InternationalRelations? The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED.), ARBITRATION: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES
16, 170 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Cecilia Olivet and Alberto Villareal, Who really won the legal battle between Philip
Morris and Uruguay?, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2016/jul/28/who-really-won-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts;
Mark
Weisbrot, Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreements Run Into Serious Resistance Due to Public Scrutiny,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrot/trans-pacificpartnershipb_4303066.html.
20. Melida Hodgson, The Trans-PacificPartnershipinestment chapter sets out a new worldwide

standard,
COLUMBIA

COLUMBIA
CENTER

FDI
ON

PERSPECTIVES ON TOPICAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT,

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-I 60-Hodgson-FINAL.pdf.

No.

160

(Nov.

ISSUES

9,

BY

2015),

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

208

VOL. 45:2

broadly consistent (and in parts entirely derivative of) the approach taken by the
U.S. for over ten years. Although States Parties to the TPP appear to have reacted
to particular investment treaty arbitration claims or awards - as well as perhaps to
general legitimacy concerns regarding how investment agreements constrain host
State regulatory space - the TPP represents an evolution rather than revolution in
the drafting of IIAs.21 Indeed, as set out below, the TPP is largely consistent with
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT 22 and recent U.S. HAs, and notably seeks to preserve the
status quo by retaining ad hoc arbitration as the mechanism for resolving investorState disputes. 23 By contrast, new EU investment treaties, including the EU-

Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), have replaced
24
investment treaty arbitration with a standing international investment court.

This paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly explains the main
features of international investment law and the debates regarding the legitimacy
of this legal regime in light of its effect on States' regulatory power; Section III
examines the main provisions of Chapter 9, the Investment Chapter of the TPP,
which address States Parties' regulatory power, and highlights how some of these
provisions were drafted in direct response to certain controversial treaty claims and
awards. This reaction is manifest in three main respects: (1) express language
asserting the inherent rights of States to regulate in the public interest; (2) denial of
benefits clauses excluding specific types of claim, such as tobacco regulations; and
(3) more detailed guidance in order to limit tribunal discretion in the interpretation
of the standards of protection in the treaty. Section IV concludes this paper.
II.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE
LEGITIMACY DEBATES REGARDING THIS REGIME

International investment law is a branch of public international law that
25
governs the protection of foreign investments in host States. IIAs are the primary
source of international investment law and establish certain substantive standards
of investment protection, including fair and equitable treatment ("FET") and
compensation for acts of expropriation. 2 6 The majority of the more-than-3,200 HAs
21. Id.
22. 2012
U.S.
Model
BIT,
Annex
B
(Expropriation),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT/2Otext/`20for/o20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
23. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, sec. B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement).
24. European Comm'n Press Release IP/16/399, CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach
on
investment
in
trade
agreement
(Feb.
29,
2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468.
25. International
Investment
Law
and
Arbitration,
ROSTRUMLEGAL,
"International
(stating
http://rostrumlegal.com/course/international-investment-law-arbitration/
investment law is a branch of public international law which governs foreign direct investment and the
resolution of disputes between foreign investors and sovereign states").
26. Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS
OF
TREATMENT
1,
70-71,
(2009),

http://www.italaw.com/documents/NewcombeandParadellLawandPracticeoflnvestmentTreatiesChapterl.pdf.
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worldwide are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which as the name suggests are
concluded between two States.27 There are also a growing number of free trade
agreements ("FTAs") that contain foreign investment protection provisions in
addition to establishing free trade areas. These may be bilateral or multilateral,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),2 8 the Energy
Charter Treaty 29 and the TPP itself.
Investor-State disputes are typically heard by an international arbitration
tribunal. 30 The creation of a neutral forum for the settlement of disputes between
investors and States is a key feature of the modem system of international
investment protection. Whereas the jurisdiction of international commercial
arbitration tribunals is based on an arbitration clause in a contract between the
parties, 31 the claimant investor in an investment treaty arbitration is not a party to
the IIA. Rather, the arbitration clause in the IIA contains an offer by the host State
to arbitrate investment disputes; the investor accepts this offer by filing a request
for arbitration. 32 This procedure for investor-State dispute settlement has famously
been described as "arbitration without privity."33 As discussed below, the use of
arbitration for investor-State dispute settlement is not without its critics. 34 Indeed,
the recently signed but not yet effective EU-Vietnam FTA,3 5 and the EU-Canada
CETA, both replace investor-State arbitration with a standing international
investment court. 36

27. See
International
Agreements
Investment
Navigator,
INVESTMENT
POLICY,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (stating there are 2958 BITS in total, 2324 of them are in
force).
28. North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992), ch. 11 (Dec. 17).
29. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, part 111.
30. Investor-State" Disputes in Trade Pacts Threaten Fundamental Principles of National
Judicial Systems,
CITIZEN.ORG,
https://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-domestic-legal-processbackground-brief.pdf.
31. Standard
ICC
Arbitration
Clauses,
INT'L
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standard-icc-arbitrationclauses/.
32. How to file a Request for Arbitration - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/How-to-File-a-Request-for-ArbitrationConvention.aspx.
33. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232 (1995).
34. See, e.g., Matthew Rimmer, A Supplementary Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties
the
Korea-Australia
Free
Trade
Agreement
5,
https://works.bepress.com/matthew-rimmer/202/ (stating that "investor-state arbitration raises some
profoundly troublesome political issues regardless of arbitrator discretion"); Danny Vinik, Why Obama
Is Spurning Liberals With a Massive Trade Deal, NEW REPUBLIC (April 7, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/1 21476/trans-pacific-partnership-foundation-all-future-trade-deals
(stating that international investment arbitration "gives extraordinary new privileges and powers and
rights to just one interest. Foreign investors are privileged vis-a-vis domestic companies, vis-a-vis the
government of a country, [and] vis-a-vis other private sector interests").
35. EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfmid=1437.
36. Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, E.U.-Can. (unratified as of Feb. 2017), ch.
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This combination of substantive and procedural protections for foreign
investors has resulted in a robust and far-reaching legal regime.3 7 Indeed,
investment treaty arbitration has been analogized to judicial review or to an
international human rights court. 38 Arbitral tribunals scrutinise the sovereign
conduct of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of host States to assess
39
compliance with the standards of protection set out in the relevant IIA. It is a
potent mechanism: to date, several tribunals have ordered the respondent State to
40
pay investors over a billion U.S. dollars in compensation for treaty violations.
Additionally, notorious inconsistencies notwithstanding, the sheer volume of
claims and resulting arbitral awards has revolutionised the practice of public
international law in little over fifteen years.41
There is an inherent tension between State regulatory power and investment
treaty arbitration. By entering into IIAs, States consent to delegate some of their
sovereignty to an international tribunal to determine when an investor is entitled to
compensation for an attributable sovereign act.4 2 The rub is that most investment
treaty claims today do not concern bright-line cases of direct expropriation - a
government's takeover of a factory plant, for example - but may seek to impugn
general regulatory measures directed at environmental protection, public health,
prudential economic regulation or other key public welfare interests.4 3 This entails
obvious economic and political implications for respondent States. As practitioner
Toby Landau explains:
8: Investment, art. 8.27, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-bychapter/ [hereinafter CETA].
37. Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015 - IIA Issues Note No.2,
UNCTAD
(July
2016),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/ISDS%20Issues%2ONote%202016.pdf ("A record high
of 70 investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) cases were filed in 2015. The overall number of publicly
known ISDS claims reached 696. Following the recent trend, a high share of new cases in 2015 (about
40 per cent) was brought against developed countries, including many cases by European investors
against European Union member States.").
38. Paul Barker, Investor-State Arbitration as International Public Law: Deference,
Proportionality and the Standard of Review, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1. Laird & T. Weiler eds., 2015).
39. Id. at 244-245.
40. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production
Company v. the Republic of Ecuador, Case No. ARB/06/1 1, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 308 (Oct.
5, 2012); Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, Final
Award, UNCITRAL, 577 (July 18, 2014); Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al. (case formerly known as
Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de
Petr6leos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., & Mobil Venezolana de Petr6leos, Inc.) v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, ICSID Arbitrual Tribunal, 133 (Oct.
9,2014).
41. Barker, supra note 38, at 235-36.
42. Id.
43. Paul Barker, LegitimateRegulatory Interests: Case Law and Developments in IIA Practice, in
REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 232-33 (Andreas Kulick ed.,

2016).
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Your mandate [as an arbitrator in investment arbitration case] unlike
commercial arbitration is to review the exercise of discretion by a
sovereign by way of its executive, its legislative even its judiciary. [. . .]
You are supposedly to rule upon the interest of an individual investor
and yet in doing so, you may well impact upon a whole community
[.. .] And, you do so with the ability to impose damages unlike many
public law municipal systems and those damages may be significant.
You have the power to affect the most extraordinary allocation of public
funds."

Indeed, investor-State tribunals have recently considered inter alia:
emergency powers exercised during national economic crises; 45 the regulation of
public utilities; 46 the regulation of harmful substances; 47 the protection of cultural
property or heritage; 48 and non-discrimination and affirmative action policies. 49
Two claimants in particular have caught the public's attention: 50 Phillip Morris,

44. Toby Landau, Response to the Report, Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection
Under
Investment
Treaties
(Dec.
14,
2010),
367-68,
https://pca-cpa.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Mauritius-Intemational-Arbitration-Conference-2010.pdf.
45. CMS Gas Transmission Co v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ICSID Arbitral
Tribunal, 108 (May 12 2005); LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v.
Argentina, Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 29 (Oct. 3, 2006);
Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Case No ARB/02/16, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 7273 (Sept 28, 2007); Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Case No ARB/01/3, Award,
ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 59 (May 22, 2007); BG Group plc v. Argentina, Case No ARB/03/9, Final
Award, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 115 (Dec. 24, 2007); Continental Casualty Co v. Argentina,
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 122 (Sept. 5, 2008); National Grid plc v.
Argentina, Award, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 96-97 (Nov. 3, 2008); Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona SA, InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Aguas SA v. Argentina, Case No.
ARB/03/17, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 90-91 (July 30, 2010); Daimler Financial Services AG,
supra note 14; PoItovA & ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Case No. ARB/13/8, Award,
ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, (Apr. 9, 2015); Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd v. Hellenic Republic,
Case No. ARB/14/16, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal.
46. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Award
(July
24,
2008),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC1589_En&caseld=C67; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3,
Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), 16 ICSID Rep. 303 (2005).
47. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,
NAFTA Arbitral Trib., 16 ICSID Rep. 40 (2005).
48. See S. Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1992); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,
Award, NAFTA Arbitral Trib., http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf.
49. See Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug.
4,
2010),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICStD/FrontServletrequestType-CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC1651_En&caseld=C90.
50. European Comm'n, Fact sheet. Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement
in
EU
agreements
5
(Nov.
2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc 151916.pdf.

212

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 45:2

which introduced two claims (both recently dismissed) against Australia and
Uruguay relating to public health measures (tobacco plain-packaging legislation); 5 1
and Vattenfall, which commenced an arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty
against Germany for the termination of that country's nuclear energy programme
following the Fukushima disaster. 52
States have been recalibrating their IIAs in response to the rapidly developing
body of international investment law.5 3 In recent years, States have sought to
reassert control over the international investment law regime when drafting new
investment treaties, for example by limiting tribunals' discretion in the
interpretation of the FET treatment and indirect expropriation standards of
protection. 54 Respondent States have consistently argued in arbitral proceedings
that IIAs do not impose liability for bona fide and non-discriminatory measures
affecting foreign investors. However, the series of awards finding Argentina
56
liable for FET violations arising out of measures taken during its financial crisiS,

and the recent NAFTA award in Bilcon v. Canada, demonstrate how potentially
far-reaching a tribunal's review of host State regulatory measures can be.
The right to regulate is centre-stage in the current negotiation of major IIAs. 8
For example, responding to widely publicised concerns, the European
Commission's policy is that all future EU IIAs will provide a detailed set of
provisions giving guidance to tribunals, "[i]n particular, [that] when the state is
protecting the public interest in a non-discriminatory way, the right of the state to
regulate should prevail over the economic impact of those measures on the
51. Philip Morris Brands Sirl, supra note 15 (dismissing Philip Morris' claims on the merits,
finding that the measures were a reasonable bona fide exercise of police powers for the protection of
public health, were not arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, discriminatory or disproportionate, and were
therefore non-compensable); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Commonwealth of Australia,
PCA Case Repository Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711 (dismissing Philip Morris' claims on jurisdictional
grounds).
52. Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Notice of Arbitration (May 31,
2012).
53. See Policy Options for IIA Reform: Treaty Examples and Data, UNCTAD (June 25, 2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Policy-options-for-IIA-reform-WIR2015.pdf.
54. Id. at 11-13.
55. See the submissions of States in, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim
2000),
26,
(June
Trib.
Arbitral
NAFTA
Award,
Saluka Investments B.V. v.
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/pope/pope-phase-10.pdf;
Czech Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, Perm. Ct. Arb. (Mar. 17, 2006),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/880; Philip Morris Brands Strl, supra note 15.
56. See e.g. CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 46; LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 46;
Sempra Energy Int'l, supra note 46; Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, LP, supra note 46; BG Group
Plc., supra note 46; Continental Casualty Co., supra note 46; National Grid P.L.C., supra note 46.
57. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton & Bilcon
of Delaware Inc. v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Perm. Ct. Arb.
(Mar. 17, 2015), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1 287.
58. European Comm'n, supra note 50, at 2.
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investor." 59 In February 2016, an express right to regulate provision was added to a
revised text of the CETA. 60 As discussed further below, in contradistinction to the
dispute settlement mechanism agreed by the States Parties to the TPP, the EU is
also demanding that its IIA counterparties replace arbitration with a new standing
investment court and appellate mechanism on the grounds that it will safeguard EU
Member States' right to regulate. 6 Both the revised CETA text and EU-Vietnam
FTA concluded in December 2015 incorporate the EU's proposed investment court
system. 62
These developments raise the prospect of regional divergence or
fragmentation of international investment law as States respond differently to
arbitral awards and criticisms of the regime. Indeed, the ICJ judge and eminent
arbitrator, James Crawford, has stated that:
Some would say investment arbitration has reached its half-life.
Emerging from, or in reaction against, earlier inter-state forms
[diplomatic protection, FCN treaties] it has a kind of 'boom-and-bust'
feel to it. Ad hoc tribunals have produced an erratic pattern of decisions,
with reasoning often impressionistic and displaying a certain disregard
for state regulatory prerogatives. This is leading in turn to a reaction by
some host states. Meantime there is much that is uncertain and
unpredictable.6 3
States' assertion of their right to regulate under international investment law
has coincided with increasing public opposition to IAS on the grounds that they
undermine the host State's right to regulate in the public interest.6
As demonstrated in the section below, the States Parties to the TPP have
likewise reacted to the prevailing concerns regarding their right to regulate.
However, the TPP member States appear to have favoured evolution rather than
wholesale change to the basic features of the regime of international investment

law. 65

59. European Comm'n, supranote 50, at 2, 7-8.
60. CETA, supra note 36, art. 8.9..
61. European Comm'n Press Release MEMO/15/6060, Why the new EU proposal for an
Investment Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both States and investors (Nov. 12, 2015).
62. European Comm'n, EU- Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Now Available Online, TRADE (Jan.
29, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1449; European Comm'n Press Release
IP/16/399, CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in trade agreement (Feb. 29,

2016).
63. James Crawford, Foreword to ZACHARY DOUGLAS,
INVESTMENT CLAIMS xxi (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
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64. Andrew Walker, 7TTP: Why the EU-US trade deal matters, BBC.cOM (May 13, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32691589.
65. See Alexander W. Resar, The Evolution of Investor-State Arbitration in the Trans-Pacific
PartnershipAgreement, 34 BERKELY J. INT'L L. 159 (2016).
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III.

STATES' RIGHT TO REGULATE AND THE TPP's INVESTMENT CHAPTER

The TPP would empower a protected investor (either an individual or
corporation) from one of the States Parties to commence international arbitration
against the government of another TPP party for measures violating the broad
66
standards of investment protection set out in the Investment Chapter. The Obama
Administration argued that:
TPP will result in higher levels of labor and environmental protections
in most TPP countries than they have today. [. . .] We can't change the
standards in the more than 3,000 agreements among other countries.
Most of those agreements will continue to exist, with or without TPP.
But through TPP, we can set a new, higher set of standards, stronger
safeguards and better transparency provisions.

.

The States Parties to the TPP have sought to safeguard their right to regulate
in their drafting of the Investment Chapter, which provides: (i) express language
68
asserting the inherent rights of states to regulate in the public interest; (ii) denial
69
of benefits clauses excluding specific types of claim, such as tobacco regulations;
and (iii) more detailed guidance in order to limit tribunal discretion in the
70
To that extent, the Investment
interpretation of the standards of protection.
Chapter is consistent with the approach taken in other IIAs, in particular recent
U.S. treaties.7
It remains to be seen whether the TPP's articles addressing host States' right
to regulate will have a substantive impact on tribunal rulings. It is significant,
however, that the States Parties to the TPP have not done away with the essential
features of the investment treaty regime, for example by retaining investor-State
arbitration.72 Indeed, the final agreed language of the Investment Chapter could be
interpreted as an affirmation by the States Parties of the basic legitimacy of
international investment law and broad acceptance of its development by arbitral
tribunals rather than an attempt to overhaul the entire system from the top down.

66. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.12.
67. Jeffrey Zients, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers, THE WHITE
HouSE: BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-state-disputesettlement-isds-questions-and-answers.
68. TPP Made in America: 9 Investment, USTR, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-ChapterSummary- Investment.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
69. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.15.
70. See TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9.
71. See Todd Allee & Andrew Lugg, Who wrote the rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?,
RESEARCH

&

POLITICS

(July-

Sep.

2016),

http://rap.sagepub.com/content/3/3/2053168016658919.full.pdf+html.
72. Shawn Donnan, U.S. looks to TPP to reform arbitration system, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 8,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d7379996-862b-l le5-90de-f44762bf9896.
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The use of express languageasserting the inherentright ofStates to
regulate in the public interest

The TPP contains express provisions on the right to regulate for the public
welfare and public health, the environment, and for financial stability. The TPP's
Preamble provides:
[The Parties recognize] their inherent right to regulate and resolve to
preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory
priorities, safeguard public welfare, and protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, the
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, the
integrity and stability of the financial system and public morals.73
Although the Preamble is non-binding, this language may be consequential.
Pursuant to the rules of treaty interpretation codified in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 74 , a tribunal should consider the
context of the terms used and the treaty's object and purpose. Article 31(2) of the
VCLT expressly provides that the preamble is part of the context for the purpose of
the interpretation of a treaty.7 6 On this basis, certain tribunals have justified broad
interpretations of investor protections on the basis of language in the IIA preamble
stating the object and purpose of the treaty to be investment promotion and
protection.7 7
The substantive standards of protection in the TPP also include express
language on the right to regulate. Article 9.16 provides:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.
This provision is
successfully made in
regulation aimed at the
Although Article 9.16

consistent with the argument that the United States has
defending NAFTA claims that a non-discriminatory
general welfare will not ordinarily violate IIA standards. 79
is arguably a signal that States intend for international

73. TPP, supra note 1, at Preamble.
74. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 31(2).
77. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
T 70, 76 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2000); Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award,
UNCITRAL Arbitral Trib., (Sept. 3, 2001), http://www.italaw.com/documents/LauderAward.pdf.
78. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.16.
79. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Counter Memorial of Respondent United States of
America
197,
UNCITRAL
Arbitral
Trib.
(Sept.
19
2006),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/73686.pdf.
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tribunals to show deference in their review of non-discriminatory bona fide
regulatory measures, it has been criticized for the perhaps circular language stating
that regulatory measures must still be consistent with the provisions of the
Investment Chapter.80 Indeed, in finding Argentina liable to pay compensation, the
tribunal in Daimlert8 did not deny that States have a right to regulate in accordance
with their international obligations. 82
B.

General exceptions and denial of benefits clauses excluding specific types
of claim, such as tobacco regulations

83
Chapter 29 sets out the Exceptions and General Provisions to the TPP.
Article 29.3 of Chapter 29 provides that "temporary safeguard measures" are
permitted in response to a financial crisis, for example "serious balance of
payments and external financial difficulties or threats thereof[,]" or where capital
movements cause or threaten to cause "serious difficulties for macroeconomic
management."8 Hodgson suggests that "the shadow of the Argentina investment
jurisprudence looms large - various Asian-Pacific countries themselves had to deal
with a scarring financial crisis around the same time." 8s Any measure taken
pursuant to Article 29.3 must, however, not be inconsistent with the National
Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and Expropriation provisions of the
Investment Chapter, and must not inter alia exceed 18 months in duration (subject
to the right to seek an extension from the other TPP States Parties).8
As expected, the TPP contains an express carve out for tobacco control
measures at Article 29.5. This innovative denial of benefits clause is a direct
response to the controversial (and recently dismissed) treaty claims brought by
Philip Morris, a global cigarette and tobacco company, against Australia and
Uruguay relating to tobacco plain-packaging legislation enacted on public health
grounds. 88 In order to protect the TPP member states against such claims, Article
29.5 provides that:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control
measure of the Party. Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration

80. Amokura Kawharu, Expert Paper #2 TPPA: Chapter 9 on Investment, WORDPRESS.COM:
TPP LEGAL (Dec. 2015), at 9, https://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ep2-amokura-kawharu.pdf.
81. See Daimler Financial Services AG, supra note 16.
82. See Daimler Financial Services AG, supra note 16, 1 100.
83. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 29.
84. TPP, supranote 1, art. 29.3.
85. Hodgson, supra note 20, at 1.
86. See TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.4-9.5, ch. 10, art. 10.3-10.4, ch. 11, art. 11.3-11.4.
87. TPP, supranote 1, at ch. 29, art. 29.5.
88. Philip Morris Brands Sarl, supra note 15 (rejecting claimants arguments, with a partial
dissenting opinion of Gary Bom); Philip Morris Asia Ltd., supra note 52; see IA Reporter story,
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevails-in-arbitration-with-philip-morris-over-

tobacco-plain-packaging-dispute/
jurisdictional grounds).

(in which

the tribunal

dismissed Philip Morris'

claims on
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under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made such an
election. If a Party has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such
claims by the time of the submission of such a claim to arbitration under
Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits
during the proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny
benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be
dismissed.89
Prior awards have taken contrasting views on whether denial of benefits
clauses operate retrospectively" or with prospective effect only.9 ' By contrast,
Article 29.5 makes clear that a host State may elect to deny benefits after an
investor has brought a dispute. 92 It is notable that in contrast to Article 29.5, the
denial of benefits provision in Article 9.15 does not contain such language.93 It is
therefore arguable whether a respondent State can invoke Article 9.15 after the

89. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 29, art. 29.5 Tobacco control measures are defined in footnote 12 to
Chapter 29 as follows:
. . a measure of a Party related to the production or consumption of manufactured tobacco
products (including products made or derived from tobacco), their distribution, labeling,
packaging, advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, or use, as well as enforcement
measures, such as inspection, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. For greater
certainty, a measure with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a
manufacturer of tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured tobacco product is not
a tobacco control measure.
90. Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, Interim Award, 1 173, UNCITRAL Arbitral Trib. (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1045.pdf (stating that the tribunal sees "no
valid reasons to exclude retrospective effects" of the denial of benefits provision, reasoning that the
very existence of a denial of benefits provision in an investment agreement alerts potential investors
that "the protection afforded by the [investment treaty] is subject during the life of the investment to the
possibility of a denial of the [investment treaty's] advantages").
91. Plama Consorium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, IN 159-65 (Feb. 8, 2005), 13 ICSID Rep. 272; Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian
Federation, Case No. 2005/05/AA228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $$ 514-15,
Penn. Ct. Arb., (Nov. 30, 2009), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/423; see also Philip Morris Asia
Ltd., supra note 52, In 38, 58; Liman Caspian Oil BV & NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICISD Case No. ARB/07/14, Excerpts of the Award, 1 225, (June 22, 2010),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/1CSID/FrontServlet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC3392_En&caseld-C106.
92. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 29, art. 29.5.
93. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 9, art. 9.15 states:
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an
enterprise of that other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise: (a) is
owned or controlled by a person of a non-Party or of the denying Party; and (b) has no
substantial business activities in the territory of any Party other than the denying Party.
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an
enterprise of that other Party and to investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party
own or control the enterprise and the denying Party adopts or maintains measures with
respect to the non-Party or a person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the
enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were
accorded to the enterprise or to its investments.
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commencement of the proceedings. 94 It also remains unclear whether arbitral
tribunals interpreting other HAs may consider that the denial of benefits clause in
that IIA cannot be invoked after the start of the proceedings where the clause does
not contain the type of express language found in Article 29.5.
C. Detailedprovisions regardinginvestment protectionstandards
Earlier generations of IAs are typically skeletal documents of little more than
ten pages, setting out "provisions for investor rights without addressing in a
comprehensive fashion the relationship of these to continuing powers of State
regulation." 95 However, since around the turn of the century, newer IIAs have
sought to clarify that they "do not purport to promote and protect investment at the
expense of other key values such as health, safety, labour protection and the
environment." 96 The result is that newer IIAs contain more detailed drafting. By
contrast to the skeletal treaties of old, 97 the TPP's Investment Chapter is 54 pages
long. 98

The TPP's Investment Chapter generally tracks the approach of recent U.S.
BITs and FTAs. 99 Notably, the language of Annex 9-B to the Investment Chapter,
which provides guidance on the distinction between indirect expropriations and
non-compensable regulatory measures, is almost exactly the same as the 2004 and
2012 U.S. Model BITs.100
In determining whether an action or a series of actions constitutes an indirect

expropriation, TPP Annex 9-B directs the tribunal to conduct:
[A] case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-

94. Notwithstanding the footnote attached to the Article 29.5 that states that the Article does not
prejudice the operation of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits).
95. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION As GOVERNANCE:
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW 23 (New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 2009).
96. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006:
Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 14, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2606/5, (Feb. 2007).
97. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Apr. 6, 1989, Treaty Series No. 3 (1992);
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Italy on the Promotion and Protection
of Investment, May 22, 1990; Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the
Government of the Republic of Albania for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Aug. 1, 1991.
98. TPP, supra note 1, 19.
99. See TPP,supra note 1; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 22.
100. Compare2012 U.S. Model BIT, supranote 22; TPP, supra note 1, at Annex 9-B.
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backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.' 0

Annex 9-B also reflects language intended to safeguard the right to regulate
first introduced in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT that has been widely copied in
subsequent IIAs worldwide.1 02 The annex directs the tribunal that "nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare
circumstances."l103
Interestingly, the States Parties to TPP rowed back from earlier draft language
that reportedly would have limited the circumstances in which a measure amounts
to a compensable treaty violation.'0 For example, in previous drafts, "rare
circumstances" were limited to situation in which the host state breached a prior
binding written commitment to investors or discriminated against it.' 05 The States
Parties also rejected language in an earlier draft providing that non-discriminatory
law making for legitimate public welfare objectives shall not be regarded as
expropriation.1 06
While the clause does not provide express guidance, it is likely that "rare
circumstances" will be interpreted narrowly. 0 7 The tribunal in the recent Philip
Morris v. Uruguay0 award held similar language found in the 2012 U.S. Model
BIT and other IIAs reflects the position under general international law that
compensation is not required where a bona fide regulatory measure is within the
State's police powers.' 9 Nevertheless, neither the police powers doctrine nor the
TPP provide blanket exceptions from compensation for States' regulatory
measures."i 0 As explained by the Pope & Talbot tribunal "much creeping
expropriation could be conducted by regulation and a blanket exception for
regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in international protections
101. TPP, supra note 1, at Annex 9-B(3)(a). In a footnote, Annex 9-B clarifies "for greater
certainty" that whether "investor's investment-backed expectations are reasonable depends, to the
extent relevant, on factors such as whether the government provided the investor with binding written
assurances and the nature and extent of governmental regulation or the potential for government
regulation in the relevant sector." TPP, supra note 1.

102. Expropriation - A Sequel, supra note 13,
103. TPP, supranote 1, at Annex 9-B(3)(b).
104.
105.
106.
107.

Kawharu,
Kawharu,
Kawharu,
Kawharu,

supranote
supranote
supranote
supra note

80,
80,
80,
80,

at
at
at
at

¶ 60.

12.
12.
12.
12.

108. Philip Morris Brands Sdrl, supranote 15.
109. Philip Morris Brands SArl, supra note 15, at 294, 300. By contrast to the 2012 U.S. Model
BIT and recent U.S. hlAs, the TPP Annex 9-B guidance on the distinction between expropriation and
non-compensable regulatory measures does not state that the Investment Chapter's provisions on
expropriation and compensation are intended to reflect customary international law.

110. Chemtura Corporation v. The Government of Canada, Ad Hoc NAFTA UNCITRAL Arbitral
Tribunal, Award, 1 266, (Aug. 2, 2010) (the police powers doctrine operates within certain limits "so
that it is not abused by governments who might enact police measures as a pretext to an

expropriation.").
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against expropriation."'" It follows that the form of measure is not determinative
to the existence of expropriation and the formal characterisation or status of a
government measure will not prevent a tribunal from assessing whether it is
expropriatory or not.112
By contrast to the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and recent U.S. HAs, the TPP Annex
9-B guidance on the distinction between expropriation and non-compensable
regulatory measures does not state that the Investment Chapter's provisions on
expropriation and compensation are intended to reflect customary international
law.

113

TPP Article 9.6, as supplemented by Annex 9-A, prescribes the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to protected investments. 114 The Article
provides that the concepts of "fair and equitable treatment [and] full protection and
security . .. do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights."" 5 This is a
continuation of existing U.S. practice and is consistent with the 2001 NAFTA Free
Trade Commission's Interpretative Note clarifying that the Minimum Standard of
Treatment ("MST") provision in NAFTA was not additive to the customary
international law standard."16
To what extent does linking FET with the customary international law
minimum standard help safeguard host States' right to regulate? The answer is not
clear. On the one hand, FET clauses that are linked to the MST have been
interpreted as having a higher threshold of liability than other unlinked/
autonomous FET clauses." 7 On the other hand, some tribunals have interpreted the
MST so broadly as to reduce the differences between the autonomous FET
standard and the MST. 1s For example, the Merrill & Ring tribunal stated that the
111. Pope & Talbot, Inc v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal 34 (June 26,
2000).
112. See, e.g., RoslnvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Comerce Case No. V079/2005, Final Award, 1 628 (Sept. 12, 2010).
113. Compare 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 20, at Annex B, 11 (stating "The Parties confirm
their shared understanding that.... Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) is intended to reflect
customary international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation."); TPP,
supra note 1, ch. 9, Annex B (does not contain this language).

114. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(2).
115. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(2).
116. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter II Provisions,
ORGANIZATION
OF
AMERICAN
STATES,
2
(July
31
2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH1 1understandinge.asp.
117. PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD: A GUIDE TO

NAFTA CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 1105, 321 (Kluwer Law International, 2013) (stating ". . . the existence
of this high threshold of severity is a predominant characteristic of NAFTA case law. It is, indeed, one
aspect that clearly differentiates it from awards rendered by non-NAFTA tribunals which have often
used a lower threshold of liability. This is certainly the case of non-NAFTA tribunals when interpreting
an unqualified FET clause").
118. Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL and NAFTA Arbitral
Tribunal, ICSID Administered, Award, (Mar. 31, 2010).
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customary MST "protects against all such acts or behavior that might infringe a
sense of fairness, equity and reasonableness."" 9 Furthermore, the Tribunal stated
that the customary MST "provides for the fair and equitable treatment of alien
investors within the confines of reasonableness." 1 20
Moreover, even when formally adopting the MST's high threshold, the extent
of the tribunal's review can be potentially far-reaching. Take Bilcon v. Canada,121
which concerned the rejection by a joint federal-provincial environmental review
panel of the claimants' application to develop a mining and marine terminal project
in Canada. In that case, a majority of the tribunal held that Canada had violated
the MST and national provision provisions of NAFTA.1 22 The majority considered
that the conduct of the joint review was arbitrary for the purposes of the NAFTA
MST standard because it departed from the methodology required by Canadian
law.1 23 This, the majority held, had the effect of depriving the claimants of a fair
opportunity to have their proposal considered in accordance with applicable laws.
The majority concluded that Canada thereby frustrated claimants' legitimate
expectations that their project would obtain environmental permission if it
complied with the environmental review process prescribed by domestic law.' 2 4 A
forceful dissent challenged the foundation of such a legitimate expectation,12 5 and
considered whether Canadian law had been complied with was arguable, since "the
Tribunal did not have the benefit of a determination by a Canadian federal court on
the matter." 2 6 Rather, the dissenting arbitrator concluded, the award constitutes a
"significant intrusion into domestic jurisdiction and will create a chill on the
7
operation of environment review panels." 2
TPP Article 9.6 also includes two sub clauses, which elaborate that measure
that are inconsistent with an investor's expectations, and the withdrawal or
amendment of a subsidy or grant, are deemed insufficient by themselves to
constitute a breach of the MST (arts 9.6.4 and 9.6.5 respectively).1 2 8
Notably, Article 9.6(4) provides that "the mere fact that a Party takes or fails
to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations" does not
constitute a breach of the MST, "even if there is loss or damage to the covered

119. Idat 210.
120. Id. at }213.
121. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc v. Canada, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2009-04, Notice of
Intent, (Feb. 5, 2008).
122. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57.
123. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, ¶ 591, 604.
124. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, J¶ 447, 603.
125. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, ¶733.
126. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McCrae, 1 34 (Mar.10, 2015).
127. Id.148.
128. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(4-5).
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investment as a result."1 2 9 It has been suggested that the provision on legitimate
expectations "seems to rule out the possibility that a state's mere thwarting of a
130
Other scholars
subjective expectation of an investor can trigger an MST breach."
suggested that this provision may indicate that "expectations-based claim may still
13 1
be possible, where a state arbitrarily departs from reasonable expectations."
Both interpretations could arguably reduce the intended effect of the clause. The
wording of the clause does not qualify its impact to subjective expectations.12 The
clause clarifies that legitimate expectations may be a factor in establishing a
violation of the FET standard but they cannot give rise to a stand-alone obligation
of the host state.1 33 The clause could also be interpreted as insuring that even if the
customary MST will develop one day to include legitimate expectations as a standalone obligation, the FET obligation under the TPP will not include legitimate
expectations as a stand-alone obligation.
Finally, the TPP contains important language on non-discrimination against
foreign investors. Article 9.4(2) sets out the national treatment obligation:
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in
its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
1 34
other disposition of investments.
A footnote to Article 9.4 expressly provides that the tribunal should consider
the State's right to regulate in determining a discrimination claim:
For greater certainty, whether treatment is accorded in 'like
circumstances' under Article 9.4 (National Treatment) or Article 9.5
(Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) depends on the totality of the
129. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.6(4).
130. Luke Eric Peterson, A First Glance at the Investment Chapter of the TPP Agreement. A
FamiliarUS-Style Structure with a Few Novel Twists 2, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Nov. 6,
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/a-first-glance-at-the-investment-chapter-of-the-tpp2015),
agreement-a-familar-us-style-structure-with-a-few-novel-twists/.
131. Kawharu, supra note 0, at 11.
132. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(4) (stating "For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party
takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not
constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a
result.").
133. This interpretation is also in light with the understanding of other TPP members. See, e.g.,
Spence Int'l Investments, LLC, Berkowitz Et Al., v. The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/13/2, Submission of the United States of America, 1 17, (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4249.pdf. ("Neither the concepts of
'good faith' nor 'legitimate expectations' are component elements of 'fair and equitable treatment'
under customary international law that give rise to an independent host State obligation"). Nevertheless,
it should be emphasized that a breach of legitimate expectation can be a factor in analyzing stand-alone
obligations (see e.g., Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corp. v Canada, Decision on
Liability and on Principles of Quantum, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 1 153,
(May 22, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl 145.pdf.
134. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.4(2).
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circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes
between investors or investments on the basis of legitimate public
35
welfare objectives.1
Whether such language would have affected the tribunal's analysis in Bilcon
is again debatable. Johnson and Sachs argue that the non-discrimination standard
should expressly require that the investor was discriminated against on grounds of
nationality.' 3 6 Johnson and Sachs appear to object to the extent of the tribunal's
discretion in determining whether "legitimate public welfare objectives" exist.13 7
However, the inclusion of right to regulate language necessarily requires tribunals
to probe such questions, and much will depend on the standard of review that the
tribunal applies.1 38
IV.

CONCLUSION

The TPP's Investment Chapter continues the recent trend in IIA practice to
include language intended to safeguard host States' legitimate public welfare
objectives. As summarised above, the TPP preamble contains express language
reaffirming the right to regulate, and the Investment Chapter itself provides
guidance on the standards of investment protection as they apply to regulatory
measures, as well as general exceptions, including the high profile tobacco control
measure denial of benefits clause and a carve out for temporary safeguard
measures in financial crises. However, the extent to which the Investment Chapter
pushes the envelope is debatable. Indeed, its provisions are remarkably consistent
with U.S. IIA practice since the 2004 Model BIT.1 39 Moreover, the final agreement
rejected earlier proposals for an express carve out for non-discriminatory
regulatory measures. In their critique, Johnson and Sachs question why taxation
measures continue to be expressly carved out from the MST provision when
environmental or health measures are not; if States Parties are "unwilling to trust"
tribunals with the former then why, Johnson and Sachs ask, not exclude the
latter?

40

The irony of the new U.S. administration's trade policy is that the TPP
arguably represented an expansion of influence of U.S. treaty practice into the
Asia-Pacific region. But it is not the only show in town. By contrast to the TPP, the

135. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.4 n.14.
136. Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP's Investment Chapter: Entrenching, rather than
reforming, a flawed system, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, 10, (Nov. 2015),

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/1 1/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21 -Nov-FINAL.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Caroline Henckels, BalancingInvestment Protectionand the Public Interest: The Role of the
standard of Review and the Importance of deference in Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. OF INT'L
DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 197 (Jan. 12, 2013) (stating that 'the standard of review applied by tribunals is
"a central means by which to calibrate the balance of power between host states and foreign investors in
international investment law.").
139. See Allee, supra note 71.
140. Johnson & Sachs, supranote 136, at 2.
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China-Australia FTA1 41 ('ChAFTA'), which was signed in 2015, has taken an
14 2
Unlike the TPP, ChAFTA
innovative approach to the right to regulate issue.
expressly excludes legitimate and non-discriminatory regulatory measures from
treaty protection.1 43 ChAFTA goes further still. Whereas the European Union has
placed its faith in an investment court system to better protect member states' right
to regulate, ChAFTA provides that a respondent State facing a claim arising out of
a regulatory measure may issue a "public welfare notice" which suspends the
investor-State proceedings for 90 days, during which the States Parties have the
opportunity to agree whether the complaint falls within the exception for legitimate
and non-discriminatory regulatory measures or not." If the States Parties are
1 45
unable to agree, the tribunal decides if the measure violates the treaty.
The TPP's Investment Chapter may not be radical, but its provisions arguably
reinforce the legal foundation for States' right to regulate for the public welfare
without incurring liability under international investment law. This may not,
however, be enough to satisfy increasingly sceptical politicians and citizens of the
46
merits of HAs.1
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